Loyola of Los Angeles International
and Comparative Law Review
Volume 35
Number 1 Summer 2012

Article 1

Summer 2012

A Solution for Developing Countries’ Problem with WTO
Noncompliance
Liran Aliav
JD/Tax LLM, Loyola Law School, 2013

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Liran Aliav, A Solution for Developing Countries’ Problem with WTO Noncompliance, 35 Loy. L.A. Int'l &
Comp. L. Rev. 1 (2012).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol35/iss1/1

This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles
International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.

A Solution for Developing Countries’
Problem with WTO Noncompliance
LIRAN ALIAV*
I. INTRODUCTION
Countries around the world are beginning a slow move towards
equality. From internal campaigns, such as the “Occupy Wall Street”
protests, to global campaigns, such as trade controversies in the World
Trade Organization (“WTO”), petitioners are demanding relief from
their alleged oppressive state.
For centuries, philosophers have grappled with how to best run an
economy.1 For the most part, the WTO seeks to eliminate
discriminatory treatment in international trade relations in order to
better the world economy.2 Trade ministers in the WTO believe that free
trade will promote economic development, alleviate poverty, and
ultimately ensure better opportunities and welfare gains for all members
participating in the multilateral trading system.3
An unregulated free trade economy is majestic in theory since
other factors, such as politics and environmental concerns, will
influence international trade aspects.4 States impose regulations that
promote their nation’s agenda, which may consequently affect
international political battles.5 The essential concept behind free trade is
* J.D., Loyola Law School, 2013; Master of Laws in Taxation, Loyola Law School, 2013; B.A.,
University of California at Los Angeles, 2009. The author would like to thank the dedicated staff
of the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review for their tireless efforts
and helpful feedback during the editing process.
1. See JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI, FREE TRADE TODAY 3–4 (2002).
2. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 501–31 (3rd ed. 1995).
3. Carmen G. Gonzales, Institutionalizing Inequality: The WTO Agreement on Agriculture,
Food Security, and Developing Countries, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 433, 435 (2002) [hereinafter
Institutionalizing Inequality].
4. See KYLE BELL, FREE TRADE OR FAIR TRADE 1–3 (2009).
5. See DAVID LANGLET, PRIOR INFORMED CONSENT AND HAZARDOUS TRADE:
REGULATING TRADE IN HAZARDOUS GOODS AT THE INTERSECTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, FREE
TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 4–5 (2009).
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that having a world economy allows every state to utilize its
comparative advantages for the betterment of the economy as a whole.6
Domestic regulation, however, negates this central principle by giving a
competitive disadvantage to foreign producers.7 For instance, “[t]raderestricting effects frequently occur even with facially nondiscriminatory
regulations because the different geographic or market positions of
foreign producers often make it more costly to comply with demanding
regulations.”8
The WTO seeks to clear roadblocks to trade on a global scale by
enforcing the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).9 Like
the Dormant Commerce Clause in the United States, the GATT includes
sections that prohibit certain regulatory measures that act as obstacles to
international trade.10 These regulatory measures are usually products of
legislative policies that promote protectionism or the ideologies of a
select domestic group, such as lobbyists.11
The recent WTO decision, Philippines—Taxes on Distilled Spirits,
highlights the tension some states wrestle with in the promotion of their
economic agendas.12 On one hand, the Filipino government required
excise taxes on imports in the hope that it would stimulate their
underdeveloped economy. On the other hand, the Philippines benefited
from the free trade policies imposed by the WTO through the GATT.
The WTO concluded that the Filipino government could not tax
imported distilled spirits at a higher rate than it does domestic distilled
spirits.13 While the WTO correctly decided this case by applying the
GATT, the WTO must shy away from its rigid enforcement of GATT
principles to level the playing field for developing countries that have
little influence within the political arena.
Part II of this comment will address the background of the
Philippines case and the reasons why the WTO came to its conclusion.
6. MICHAEL M. J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
FREE TRADE 486–87 (3rd ed. 2005).
7. Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A GATT’sEye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1402 (1994).
8. Id.
9. See generally Donald. P. Kommers & Michael Waelbroeck, Legal Integration and the
Free Movement of Goods: The American and European Experience, in INTEGRATION THROUGH
LAW, BOOK 3, FORCES AND POTENTIAL FOR A EUROPEAN IDENTITY 165 (Mauro Cappelletti et
al. eds., 1986).
10. General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 188,
art. XX [hereinafter GATT]; see also Farber & Hudec, supra note 7, at 1403.
11. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKLEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION (1991).
12. Panel Report, Philippines – Taxes on Distilled Spirits, WT/DS396 (Aug. 15, 2011).
13. Id. at 98B.
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Next, I will compare similar cases upholding the same analysis and
discuss the history of the WTO’s tests comparing “like products” under
the GATT. In assessing these tests, I will highlight the problems with
each test and show how it evolved to the form of the test the WTO
implements today.
Part III will discuss the issues surrounding WTO compliance in
developed countries. I will compare the concept of facially neutral but
discriminatory laws under the Commerce Clause in the United States
with those of the GATT. Part IV will propose a solution for the WTO
that would alleviate tensions between developing countries seeking to
stimulate economic growth and those countries that use their stronger
political influence to strategically circumvent the WTO and the GATT.
The section will also address rebuttals and how the proposed solution is
compatible with capitalism in the United States. I conclude that
developing countries such as the Philippines should be able to impose
taxes, in a facially neutral but possibly discriminatory manner, on
uncooperative developed countries in order to further their economic
agenda and level the international playing field.
II. ANALYZING THE COURT’S DECISION IN THE PHILIPPINES—
TAXES ON DISTILLED SPIRITS
A. History Behind the Case
Distilled spirits are made from different types of raw materials
such as sugar, palm and grains.14 Alcohol producers can make products
labeled with the same name from different raw materials.15 For instance,
whiskey is produced by fermenting either wheat or sugar.16 Both wheatbased whiskey and sugar-based whiskey are labeled “whiskey” and are
usually interchangeable products in the common household.17
The Philippines is a major producer and exporter of sugar, nipa,
coconut, cassava, and palm (the “designated materials”).18 Since the
country is blessed with these raw materials, Philippines-based producers
almost always manufacture their distilled spirits from the designated
materials. Producers in other countries, however, produce distilled
spirits with other raw materials. Thus, most of the alcohol imported into
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id. at ¶ 7.61.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the Philippines is not produced from the designated materials.19
The Filipino government taxes distilled spirits made from different
raw materials at dissimilar rates.20 As a result, all imported alcohol is
subject to a higher tax, resulting in lost profits for foreign producers.21
For several years, the U.S. Government has been urging the Filipino
government to change their tax fee schedule, both bilaterally and in
WTO forums.22 In addition, the European Union requested WTO
dispute settlement consultations on these taxes in July 2009, and were
joined by the United States in October 2009.23 The European Union and
the United States (hereinafter “Petitioners”) brought suit in the WTO
under GATT Article III:2, and other sections, prohibiting the imposition
of different tax rates on similar products.
Article III:2 of the GATT states, “[t]he products of the territory of
any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting
party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other
internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied directly or
indirectly, to like domestic products.”24 In other words, regardless of
domestic or international origin, like products should be subject to the
same direct and indirect excise tax rates.25
The WTO panel received written submissions from Petitioner in
October 2010 and issued an interim report on May 4, 2011. The panel
then issued its final reports on June 27, 2011.26 The appellate body
circulated its report on December 21, 2011.27 This paper will explore the
Panel’s assessment of the case.
B. The Criteria to Assess Like Products
1. Trouble with Assessing “Like” Products
The WTO has not always used the same factors to assess whether

19. Id. at ¶ 2.37.
20. Id. at ¶ 2.2–2.3.
21. Id. at ¶ 7.183.
22. U.S. Trade Rep., U.S. Files WTO Case Challenging Philippine Excise Taxes (Jan. 2010),
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2010/january/us-files-wto-casechallenging-philippine-excise-ta.
23. Id.
24. GATT art. III:2.
25. Id.
26. Panel Report, Philippines – Taxes on Distilled Spirits, WT/DS396 (Aug. 15, 2011)
[hereinafter Philippines Tax Case].
27. Report of the Appellate Body, Philippines – Taxes on Distilled Spirits, WT/DS396 (Dec.
21, 2011).
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two products are “like” under Article III:2.28 The test has been a product
of evolution, and rightfully so.29 Assessing “like” products is extremely
difficult, especially when accounting for the differences in cultures,
environment, production, uses, and other external and internal factors.30
One descriptive scenario where the test for “like” products has
been applied is where two countries have classified the same product
differently.31 For instance, an object may be used similarly by both
country A and country B. However, the object may be considered
harmful to country A’s environment, but be useful and harmless to
country B. Therefore, country A may label the product as an
“environmentally unfriendly material” and impose taxes on it. Country
B, on the other hand, may label it as “promoting health and good
economy” and incentivize its production by offering subsidies and tax
breaks.32 Both products may look exactly the same, and may be used in
the same way, but are ultimately classified differently because of
external factors that reflect each country’s political, social, and
economic agenda.33
2. How the WTO Came to its Conclusion
The Philippines taxes whisky, gin, brandy, rum, vodka, tequila,
and liqueurs at a lower rate when they are made from the “designated
materials.34 The fermentation process converts these raw materials into
ethyl alcohol and the manufacturer distills the product to its liking.35
The color, odor, and taste of the alcohol are natural results of the
distillation of ethyl alcohol.36 In the Philippines, domestic producers
distill their alcohol from sugar cane molasses, which is one of the
designated materials.37 There is no evidence that suggests that a
layperson in the Philippines can distinguish between imported and
domestic spirits based on the raw materials used to produce them.38

28. Edward S. Tsai, “Like” Is a Four-Letter Word – GATT Article III’s “Like Product”
Conundrum, 17 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 26, 46–47 (1999).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Philippines Tax Case, supra note 26, at 1.171.
35. Id. at ¶ 2.22.
36. Id. at ¶ 2.25.
37. Id.
38. Id. at ¶ 2.26.
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3. Assessing a Violation of the First Sentence
of Article III:2 of the GATT
The WTO Panel assessed the likeness of the products by analyzing
each type of distilled spirit on a product-by-product basis.39 The first
sentence of Article III:2 reads, “[t]he products of the territory of any
contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting
party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other
internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied directly or
indirectly, to like domestic products.”40 The WTO answered two
questions to determine whether a violation of Article III:2 of the GATT
existed: (1) whether the imported and domestic products were “like”
products, and (2) whether the imported products are taxed in excess of
the domestic products.41 If both questions could be answered in the
affirmative, then the Philippines was in violation of of Article III:2.42
The WTO analyzed “likeness” by assessing four factors: (1) the
product’s properties, nature, and quality; (2) the product’s end uses in a
given market; (3) consumers’ tastes and habits; and (4) tariff
classification.43 The Court clarified that the products do not have to be
identical since the language of the GATT would have said “identical”
instead of “like products”.44 The Court then analyzed whether the tax on
international products was in excess of the domestic product.45
a. Like Products Factors
i. The Product’s Properties, Nature and Quality
The appellate body in European Commission – Asbestos ruled that
this category is “intended to cover the physical qualities and
characteristics of the products.”46 The Philippines argued that since the
raw materials are wholly different, the chemical composition of the
different brands and the organoleptic properties of spirits are not

39. Id. at ¶ 7.19.
40. Id. at ¶ 7.8.
41. Id. at ¶ 7.30.
42. Id.
43. Id. at ¶ 7.31.
44. Id. at ¶ 7.32.
45. Id.
46. Id. at ¶ 7.34 (citing Appellate Body Report, Citing EC – Asbestos, para. 110). The
appellate body referenced this in analyzing likeness according to Article IV; however, the Panel
in Philippines – Taxes on Distilled Spirits found that it should be applicable to Article II as well.
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“like”.47 The court disagreed.48
The court found the Philippines’ argument unpersuasive since the
chemical composition or organoleptic properties do not divide the
spirits produced from different raw materials into separate identifiable
groups.49 The court even examined the organoleptic properties of each
type of alcohol and concluded that even if the chemical compositions
are different due to the use of different raw materials, the alcohol results
in the same organoleptic properties.50 For instance, producing alcohol
with different raw materials or with distinct fermentation processes may
result in alcohols that have different colors, such as with brandy,
whisky, and tequila. The taste that is associated with that alcohol
remains the same because they are neutral alcohols.51 The Panel thus
concluded that the properties, nature, and quality of the product are
similar.52
Moreover, the court asserted that the difference in raw materials is
only relevant to the extent that it results in a dissimilar final product.53
The court found that all distilled spirits in the present dispute are similar
in that they are concentrated distilled potable alcohol with varying
alcohol content.54 In addition, consumption of distilled spirits usually
causes similar physiological effects due to the presence of ethyl
alcohol.55
ii. End Uses
In assessing this factor, the WTO looks to see if the products serve
the same or similar end uses.56 The panel found that the end uses of
alcohol are “thirst quenching, socialization, relaxation and pleasant
intoxication.”57 Since the manner in which people drink the product
does not depend on what raw materials were used in the production, the
court found that there are no differences in the products’ end uses.58

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
42.

Id. at ¶ 7.40.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 7.42–7.47.
Id. at ¶ 7.36.
Id. at ¶ 7.39.
Id. at ¶ 7.37.
Id. at ¶ 7.35.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 7.48.
Id.
Id.
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iii. Consumers’ Tastes and Habits
By applying this factor, the WTO ensures the product is not used
for different functions.59 Filipino consumers’ tastes and habits are a
product of personal experience, product reputation, brand loyalty, and
their limited propensity to switch brands based on income and
expenditure constraints.60
The Philippines argued that the brands are not substitutable and
offered a survey by Abrenica and Ducanes that concluded there is low
price elasticity in the Philippine domestic distilled spirits market.61
Petitioners argued that the taxes are part of the reason why the price of
imported brands is high and therefore unappealing to the majority of the
Philippines population.62
The WTO criticized both parties’ reports and studies because they
assume that the domestic price will increase and the imported price will
decrease simultaneously.63 The court explained that the increase in
consumption could be caused by an increase in domestic price, a
decrease in imported price, or a combination of both.64 Since the rate of
consumption was impossible to predict, the studies were flawed.65
The Philippines also argued that the population is separated into
two groups based on purchasing power.66 The majority of the
population, segmented into the lower purchasing power group, only
consumed distilled spirits made from designated raw materials.67
Therefore, the Philippines concluded that habits and tastes are set for
this specific group.68 The WTO rightfully found the fallacy of this
argument since it assumes that if the group with lower purchasing
power has the ability to purchase more expensive alcohol, they would
refrain from doing so because of habit. This assumption was not
59. Id. at ¶ 7.49.
60. Id. at ¶ 7.50. See also M.J. Abrenica and J. Ducanes, On Substitutability Between
Imported and Local Distilled Spirits (Oct. 10, 2010), Panel Exhibit (PH-49) at the University of
Philippines School of Economics Foundation.
61. Philippines Tax Case, supra note 26, at ¶ 7.52, ¶ 7.55. A narrowing of price differentials
between imported distilled spirits and domestic Philippines distilled spirits results in a small
change in their respective market shares.
62. Id. at ¶ 7.52, 7.54 (arguing that “on average at an import price decrease of 25% and
domestic increase of 50%, consumers were 4.9% more willing to purchase imports and 4.0% less
likely to purchase domestics . . . if price were no issue, on average, consumers were 43% more
likely to purchase local brands and 86% more likely to purchase imported ones”).
63. Id. at ¶ 7.58.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at ¶ 7.56.
67. Id. at ¶ 7.58.
68. Id. at ¶ 7.58–7.59.

2012]

A Solution for Developing Countries

9

supported by the Philippines.69
In addition, the court found that the cheaper domestic spirits mimic
the labels of their imported counterparts even when they are produced
by different raw materials.70 For instance, domestic producers label
“blended brandy” as “brandy” to mimic the label of its imported
counterpart.71 Moreover, the labels do not mention the type of raw
material used in making the product.72 As a result, the court found that
the tastes and habits of the consumers are not different regarding
domestic or imported spirits.73
iv. Tariff Classification
The court found that the Harmonized System (“HS”), which is the
rate schedule that describes the products and provides the tax rate of
each item, does not differentiate between different raw materials used
for production of the spirits.74 The court held that “all distilled spirits at
issue in this dispute, whether imported or domestic, and irrespective of
the raw materials from which they are made, fall within the HS heading
2208, which refers to “undenatured ethyl alcohol of an alcoholic
strength by volume of less than 80% vol[ume]; spirits, liqueurs and
other spirituous beverages.”75
b. Excess Taxation
The second question that the court addressed is whether the
international product is taxed “in excess of” the domestic product.76 Past
panels have held that “even the smallest amount of excess is too
much.”77 The panel noted that the difference in tax rate for the
international product is about ten to forty times the rate imposed on the
domestic product.78 The Philippines did not dispute this fact.79
Therefore, the court concluded that there was excess taxation.80

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at ¶ 7.58–7.59.
Id. at ¶ 7.61.
Id. at ¶ 7.62.
Id. at ¶ 7.61.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 7.63.
Id. (quotation omitted).
Id. at 7.86.
Id. at ¶ 7.87 (quotation omitted).
Id. at ¶ 7.88.
Id. at ¶ 7.89.
Id. at ¶ 7.90.
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4. Assessing a Violation Under the Second Sentence
of Article III:2 of the GATT.
The second sentence of Article III:2 of the GATT provides that
“no contracting party shall . . . apply internal taxes to imported or
domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in
paragraph 1”.81 Article III:1 states that, “taxes and other internal
charges, and laws, regulations and requirements . . . should not be
applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to
domestic production.”82
The court also assessed whether the products are “directly
competitive or substitutable products” and whether “they are not
similarly taxed”.83 The court concluded that both of these elements were
present after analyzing similar factors to those used in assessing a
violation under the first sentence of the GATT.84
The court then analyzed whether the Philippines implemented the
tax to afford protection to domestic production. Petitioners argued that
the magnitude in tax difference alone supports the claim that the excise
tax is applied “so as to afford protection”.85 Complainants also pointed
to a lack of rationality of the product differentiation used by the
measure, the fact that the measure is de facto discriminatory, and the
fact that the Philippines were aware of the discrimination.86
On the other hand, the Philippines argued that the tax differentials
are de minimis and are “rooted in historical association between liquor
made from designated raw materials and the average Filipino, who is a
low income person.”87 The Philippines also argued that the tax is originneutral, giving any producer the opportunity to take advantage of the
lower tax rates.
In considering “whether the dissimilar taxation affords protection,
the Panel [sic] found it is not a question of intent or aim, but rather one
of the protective application of the measure.”88 The court ascertained the
“protective application” by examining the tax design, architecture, and
revealing nature.89 The court concluded that the taxes afforded
protection because all of the Philippine products were produced from
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

GATT art. III:2.
Id. at III:1 (emphasis added).
Philippines Tax Case, supra note 26, at 7.96 (quotation omitted).
Id. at ¶ 7.138.
Id. at ¶ 7.170 (quotation omitted).
Id. at ¶ 7.171–7.172.
Id. at ¶ 7.174–7.175 (quotation omitted).
Id. at ¶ 7.180.
Id. at ¶ 7.180.
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designated materials as opposed to a small percentage of foreign
products.90 The court also concluded that the legislative intent is not at
the heart of the assessment of protectionism.91
5. The History of the Likeness Test
The WTO had its fair share of problems defining “like” products
under Article III:2. Early cases in the WTO adopted a two-step test for
assessing a violation of Article III:2.92 The first step was to evaluate
whether the imported and domestic product was “like” or “directly
competitive or substitutable.”93 The second step was to compare the
difference in tax burdens on the products in controversy.94
The panel in the “Border Tax” report noted that “likeness” depends
on both objective and subjective criteria.95 Objective refers to
composition and manufacturing process, while subjective refers to
consumption patterns and general uses of the product.96 However, the
panel injected an element of vagueness to ensure discretionary and
subjective judgments by stating that minor differences in physical
properties would not prevent products from qualifying as “like
products.”97 Only if the court determined that the products were “like”
did it then inquire into whether the country taxed the product
discriminatorily.98 As a result of this tiered test, a finding of “likeness
triggers a very protective trade standard.”99
Subsequent panels reconsidered the approach in the Border Tax
report. In United States – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt
Beverages, the panel added another consideration to the previous
method of assessing likeness: the like product determination should
account for the purpose of Article III as a whole.100 The panel noted the
article’s purpose is to prevent the use of internal taxes and regulation to
protect domestic production, as opposed to preventing differential
90. Id. at ¶ 7.182, 7.187.
91. Id. at ¶ 7.184.
92. Tsai, supra note 28, at 30.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 30–31.
95. Panel Report, Japan—Customs, Duties, Taxes and Labeling Practices on Imported
Wines and Alcoholic Beverages, ¶ 5.7, L/6216-34S/83 (Nov. 10, 1987) [hereinafter Japan –
Customs, Duties and Labeling Practices].
96. Id.
97. Tsai, supra note 28, at 31.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 32.
100. Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, ¶ 5.24,
DS23/R -39S/206 (June 19, 1992) [hereinafter Malt Beverages Panel].
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treatment for policy reasons.101 As a result, the “like product” test
incorporated a new element into its assessment: whether it violates
Article III’s prohibition against protecting domestic producers.102
Eventually, the two-step test evolved into a one-step test.103 The
test, called the “aim-and-effect test,”104 assessed solely the motives
behind the regulation to find a discriminatory purpose, which violated
Article III:2.105 This test, however, was problematic because the panel
now needed to differentiate between valid and invalid regulatory
schemes without first assessing whether the product was similar.106
Under this test, the distinction between “like products” and “directly
competitive or substitutable product” vanished.107 Rather, the test
inquired into whether the tax was implemented with a desired outcome
of discrimination and whether the tax actually did discriminate between
the two products.108 As one can imagine, the aim-and-effect test
essentially opened the doors for courts to find any two products similar,
so long as they were in direct competition or substitutable.109
Nevertheless, the aim-and-effect test is attractive because it
functions to enhance the regulatory autonomy of Member states.110 This
approach can save legitimate domestic regulations, such as the
regulations for non-protectionist food labeling rules and protecting
historic buildings.111
The aim-and-effect test, however, may cause an accidental
disadvantage against imported products.112 In addition, the aim-andeffect test is prone to circumvention.113 Because the determination of
likeness depends on the legislature’s purpose for implementing the
measure, problems arise with legislation that has more than one aim.114
Manipulation of legislative history to avoid WTO suits115 and translation
issues with the texts can produce ambiguous, obscure, manifestly
101. Id. at ¶ 5.25
102. Tsai, supra note 28, at 33–34.
103. Id. at 35.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 34.
106. Id. at 35–36.
107. Id. at 36.
108. Id. at 35.
109. Id. at 36.
110. Won Mog Choi, Overcoming the “Aim and Effect” Theory: Interpretation of the “Like
Product” in GATT Article III, 8 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 107, 115 (2002).
111. Id. at 116.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 117–18.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 119.
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absurd, and unreasonable aims.116
Over the past two decades, scholars have proposed solutions to the
weaknesses of the aim-and-effect test and the two-step product test that
would incorporate the goals and motives of the GATT. For instance,
one scholar suggests that the WTO should exclude extraneous factors
from the assessment of likeness to enhance court predictability and
stabilize the concept of like products.117
The aim-and-effect test did not last long.118 The 1996 Panel Report
on Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages119 disposed of the aim-andeffect test by arguing that the GATT’s language, read literally, did not
support the test.120 According to the panel, Article III:2 requires the
court to assess two separate legal obligations: (1) likeness, and (2)
directly competitive or substitutable.121 The panel essentially revived the
prongs of the two-step “like product” test, while also adding another
prong.122 The steps thus became: (1) whether the products were similar,
(2) whether the contested measure was an “internal tax” or “other
internal charge,” and (3) whether the tax imposed on foreign products
was in excess of that imposed on domestic products.123
Even with this improved two-step test, scholars still criticize the
test’s lack of consideration for extraneous factors.124 The new test
implemented by Japan Alcohol Panel is a literalist approach, which
compels the court to abide by the GATT’s language. The problem with
this test, however, is that there may be a loophole in the GATT.125 This
loophole could be exploited if it were to easily pass the Japan Alcohol
Panel prongs.126

116. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. See also U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969), reprinted in 8
I.L.M. 679 (1969).
117. Choi, supra note 110, at 119.
118. Tsai, supra note 28, at 36-37.
119. Panel Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/R, WT/DS10/R,
WT/DS11/R (July 11, 1996) [hereinafter Japan Alcohol Panel].
120. Id. at 132.
121. Tsai, supra note 28 at 37.
122. Id. at 37.
123. Japan Alcohol Panel, supra note 119, at 134.
124. Choi, supra note 110, at 121.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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III. COMPARING THE GATT WITH THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
A. The United States’ Dormant Commerce Clause
Article III of the GATT resembles the United States’ Dormant
Commerce Clause (“DCC”). While the DCC lacks a clear textual basis,
its judicial interpretations employ the same basic principles under which
the GATT is modeled.127 In effect, the DCC seeks to equalize the
economic playing field by prohibiting the implementation of
discriminatory laws on free trade between the states.
Courts interpreting the DCC have classified cases into three
categories. The first category consists of facially discriminatory
measures taken against interstate commerce. For instance, in City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court nullified a law that
prohibited importing waste from other states because it discriminated
against articles of commerce coming from outside the state.128 The Court
reasoned that, “unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to
treat them differently,” the measure is facially discriminatory.129
The second category involves those laws that are not facially
discriminatory. The Supreme Court ruled that if the law has a
discriminatory effect while not being facially discriminatory, then the
law violates the DCC.130 If a law has a discriminatory effect, the state
has the burden to “justify it both in terms of the local benefits flowing
from that statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives
adequate to preserve the local interest at stake.”131
The third category also involves facially nondiscriminatory
regulations that negatively affect interstate commerce.132 As opposed to
having a “discriminatory effect,” as in the second category, these
regulations have an incidental effect and are subject to a balancing
test.133 The court balances the need for such a regulation, based on some
legitimate purpose, with the degree of discrimination and the effects of
the law on interstate commerce.134
The problem with these classifications is drawing the line between
categories two and three.135 Usually, the provisions the WTO deems
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Farber & Hudec, supra note 7, at 1408.
City of Philadelphia. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978).
Id. at 627.
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm’n., 432 U.S. 333, 352–53 (1977).
Id. at 353.
Farber & Hudec, supra note 7, at 1413.
See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
Id.
Farber & Hudec, supra note 7, at 1414.
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constitutional have public health or safety issues at stake.136 Some courts
have suggested the third category only applies to discriminatory burdens
rather than baleful effects.137
Over time, however, the balancing test has proven to be somewhat
138
lax. Typically, the state is only required to present some evidence of a
regulatory benefit while the court usually considers the law “as the
empirical judgments of lawmakers concerning the utility of
legislation.”139
Typically, a statute that discriminates between different products
based on their location of manufacture is facially discriminatory.140 In
those cases involving facially neutral regulations, courts look for
discriminatory intent, use of a proxy characteristic, competitive
advantage, and uniformity and consistency in order to assess its degree
of discrimination.141
B. The GATT’s Correspondence with the DCC
The GATT is an international agreement that contains protectionist
trade barriers promoting free world trade.142 Its structure starts with
“tariff bindings,” which set a maximum rate for tariffs for each item.143
Aside from the bindings and rules related to them, the GATT raises the
same issues as the DCC under U.S. law.144 Like the DCC, GATT courts
classify laws as facially discriminatory or facially neutral.145 In addition,
much like in the DCC, the GATT lays out exceptions in Article XX for
when discriminatory measures are enforceable, such as when the
measures involve a widely accepted regulatory objective for health and
safety.146
When dealing with a facially discriminatory policy, the GATT
requires a more elaborate legal analysis of the exceptions to
discriminatory measures than the DCC.147 This is because the GATT
gives weightier attention to a country’s plea for justifying its regulation
136. See Electrolert Corp. v. Barry, 737 F.2d 110, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
137. Farber & Hudec, supra note 7, at 14.
138. Id. at 1415.
139. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 680 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
140. Farber & Hudec, supra note 7, at 1416.
141. Id.
142. Id at 1418.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1419.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1420.
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or law.148 Since the WTO regulates more than one country,149 it must be
sensitive to the varying justifications given by States having a unique
outlook on the global market and different social customs and traditions.
On the other hand, the DCC only regulates the United States, where
people have similar social and economic norms, which results in less
variance within the law.150 Moreover, each state must comply with
federal law and may not opt-out of the Constitution. Therefore, a WTO
panel, made up of judges and representatives from different parts of the
world, must be more lenient in their assessment of like products and
violations of the GATT policies.
When dealing with facially neutral classifications, the GATT does
not divide the category into two subcategories like the DCC.151 The
GATT usually deals with two types of facially neutral measures – those
that “provide different taxes or regulatory treatment for two groups of
similar products in a way that places all or most foreign products in the
disadvantaged category;”152 and those that have exactly the same
restrictions placed on both international and domestic producers such
that it is “substantially more difficult for foreign producers to comply
with because of their different geographical or market positions.”153 The
aforementioned Philippines case can be viewed as a mixture of both
facially neutral types. The alcohol tax distinguishes between the raw
materials used in distilling the alcohol in a country where most domestic
production of the spirit is made from raw materials found domestically,
subjecting the domestic companies to a lower tax rate.
C. The Inherent Problem of Taxation Between Developed
and Developing Countries.
The relevant factor indicating discrimination here is the use of a
proxy characteristic.154 This applies when a state regulates on the basis
of some neutral characteristic that “has little independent significance
and is in reality a proxy for geographic differences—that is, the
characteristic is shared by virtually all in-state firms and virtually no
out-of-state firms.”155 In the Philippines case, the Panel found the tax
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1421.
152. Id. at 1422.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1423.
155. Id. at 1416. See also Atlantic Prince, Ltd. v. Jorling, 710 F. Supp. 893, 902–03
(E.D.N.Y. 1989) (striking down a New York ban on commercial fishing vessels over ninety feet
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discrimination criteria based on raw material used to manufacture the
product had little independent significance and was set up to
discriminate between all in-state firms and virtually no out-of-state
firms.156
But how could the panel be certain that the taxes were set up for
this alleged purpose? Let us consider this scenario: Filipino alcohol
manufacturers found a business opportunity in the sale of alcoholic
beverages. These manufacturers compared the cost of manufacturing
alcohol with different raw materials and realized that it was more
profitable to use domestically produced materials. These manufacturers
then approached the country’s legislature to propose a bill taxing them
at a favorable rate. Assume that the Philippines have a comparative
advantage and a niche in the market of sugar cane. The Filipino
government understood that by charging a more favorable rate, it would
stimulate their economy (farmers, transportation companies, and
processing plants all prosper as a result) and produce much needed
revenue for the country’s development programs. Without the intention
to discriminate against foreign produced items, the Filipino government
then passed a tax law granting a more favorable rate to anyone using the
specified raw materials to produce any alcoholic spirits.
The policy does not inherently discriminate against international
markets. Any manufacturer can take advantage of this tax break by
producing their alcohol with such materials. Why should a developing
country, in desperate need of revenue to stimulate its economy, not
exploit the fruits provided by its land? How should a country that does
not have the manpower to exploit cheap and efficient labor such as
China, or does not have the capital to build technological schools and
promote scientific research, advance its economic agenda to compete
with the rest of the developed countries on a global scale? The answer
lies below. But before addressing the answer, another issue must be
addressed to justify the solution and shed light on the injustice within
the WTO.
D. Developed Countries and GATT Adherence
The “national treatment” rule found in Article III of the GATT
requires that internal taxes and internal regulations treat foreign goods
no less favorably than “like” domestic goods.157 Its principal aim is to

in length because only one such vessel was from New York).
156. Philippines Tax Case, supra note 26 at 7.187–7.188.
157. Farber & Hudec, supra note 7, at 1422.
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promote fairness by treating all contracting parties similarly.158
Often, however, the playing field is far from fair. For instance, the
Bush administration, in an effort to promote the agendas of its
agricultural lobby, passed an “aggressive” farm bill in 2002.159 The bill,
named the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (“Farm
Bill”), gave an artificial advantage to American farmers by providing
incentives in the form of subsidies.160 As explained below, with these
subsidies in place, many farmers produced at capacity instead of
responding to market demands.161
Currently, the United States spends about three billion dollars per
year subsidizing its own farmers.162 The European Union also subsidizes
its farmers heavily.163 For instance, farmers with cows get a subsidy of
two dollars per cow a day.164 The trade distortion created by these
subsidies substantially affects developing countries’ ability to compete
in the world market.165 Scholars have noted that “excessive subsidies
lead to overproduction, depression of world prices, and the reduction of
many developing nations’ farmers to poverty.”166
Developing countries usually have a specific dominant industry in
agriculture.167 Job opportunities are usually limited so some devote their
lives to learning the operational skills needed for that specific market.168
Economists predicted a force out of countries that are currently
otherwise in compliance with international agreements, such as the free
trade regulations of the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank.169 In addition, Argentina and Brazil are projected to suffer
damages in the amount of 39 billion dollars because of the change in
commodity prices due to this Farm Bill.170
The Farm Bill also affected the Philippines, a member of the WTO
158. Vance E. Hendrix, The Farm Bill of 2002, The WTO, and Poor African Farmers: Can
They Co-Exist?, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 227, 231–32 (2004).
159. The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat.
134 (2002) [hereinafter Farm Bill].
160. Hendrix, supra note 158.
161. Id. at 245.
162. Id. at 246.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Ari Afilalo, Not in My Back Yard: Power and Protectionism in U.S. Trade Policy, 34
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 749, 766 (2002).
168. Id.
169. New U.S. Farm Bill Upsets WTO Partners, Could Hurt Developing Countries, BRIDGES
TRADE BIORES, May 16, 2002, available at http://ictsd.org/downloads/biores/biores2-9.pdf.
170. Id.

2012]

A Solution for Developing Countries

19

since 1995.171 The country’s officials believed that the cheap price of
labor in their country would balance out the inflated prices abroad.172
The government predicted that accessing world markets through the
WTO would create a “net gain of a half-million farming jobs a year, and
improve the country’s trade balance.”173 This proved to be false because
of the subsidies given to farmers in other countries such as in the United
States and the European Union.174
It is almost impossible for a small developing country such as the
Philippines to compete against the billions of dollars in subsidies given
to international farmers.175 The Philippines have lost hundreds of
thousands of farming jobs since joining the WTO.176 Some Filipinos
view the Farm Bill’s impact on domestic farmers as a modern version of
imperialism.177
In the Philippines, the subsidies given to American and European
farmers help them sell grain at a price that is less than the break-even
point for farmers in developing countries.178 One news writer describes
the subsidy process as “kicking aside the development ladder for some
of the world’s most desperate people harvesting poverty around the
world.”179 Allowing the markets to run freely without the aid of
subsidies would improve the global welfare by a projected 120 billion
dollars.180
The Farm Bill conflicted with the United States’ commitments to
the World Trade Organization.181 Under the WTO, “actionable”
subsidies were allowed so long as “they do not (a) cause an injury to a
domestic industry of another Member; (b) nullify or impair the benefits
other Members are accruing under the SCM182 Agreement; or (c) cause
serious prejudice to the interest of another Member.”183 One
commentator stated that:
Agriculture and food are fundamental to the well-being of all people,
171. Editorial, The Rigged Trade Game: The WTO in the Philippines, N.Y. TIMES, July 20,
2003, at 4 [hereinafter The Rigged Trade Game].
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1.
180. Id. at 2.
181. Hendrix, supra note 158, at 229.
182. Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
183. Hendrix, supra note 158, at 229.
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both in terms of access to safe and nutritious food and as foundations
of healthy communities, cultures and environment . . . . Instead of
ensuring the right to food for all, these institutions have created a
system that prioritizes exportoriented [sic] productions and has
increased global hunger and poverty while alienating millions from
184
productive assets and resources such as land, water, and seeds. . . .
It is time that we insist on trade policies of Washington based on
sound policy and reason, rather than on the supposed necessities of
185
maintaining a political and market dominance.

While many members of the WTO and scholars disapproved of the
Farm Bill, proponents of the bill justified its $19.1B ceiling on subsidies
by pointing out that other countries subsidized their farmers at higher
ceiling rates of $60B for the European Union and $30B for Japan.186
Another justification for the proposed rate is that $19.1B is far less than
what was spent before the bill was passed.187
E. Playing Games with Compliance
The 2007 successor to the Farm Bill did not alleviate the issues its
predecessor had with the WTO.188 Since the 2007 Farm Bill gave
“producers the option of remaining in the 2002 counter-cyclical
payments program,” it did not remedy the problems endemic to the
counter-cyclical payments program, namely its price-contingent
nature.189 In response to continued conflicts with the WTO, the United
States passed the Average Crop Revenue Election Program (“ACRE”)
in 2009.190 While it attempts to comply with the WTO cyclical payments
rulings by basing them on yields instead of prices, WTO members are
nevertheless not satisfied with ACRE because the subsidy is still in a
category that hurts other WTO members.191
Specifically, the 2007 Farm Bill caused “market loss and price
suppression to the upland cotton market”.192 It seems that, with respect
to WTO compliance, some legislators continue to be resolute and
184. Anuradha Mittal, Giving Away the Farm: The 2002 Farm Bill, FOOD FIRST (July 8,
2002), http://www.foodfirst.org/node/52.
185. Id.
186. Hendrix, supra note 158.
187. Id. at 248.
188. Phoenix X.F. Cai, Think Big and Ignore the Law: U.S. Corn and Ethanol Subsidies and
WTO Law, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 865, 882 (2009).
189. Id.
190. Farm
Bill
Accomplishments,
USDA
(Jan.
9,
2009),
http://www.usda.gov/documents/fbJan09.pdf.
191. Cai, supra note 188, at 883.
192. Id.
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hostile.193 On the other hand, proponents of WTO compliance in the
United States continue to argue that WTO compliance will require a
meaningful restructuring of the subsidies program.194
United States noncompliance has enraged many developing
countries.195 These countries have waited five years, since the 2002
Farm Bill, for some positive movement towards WTO compliance.196
Before the Farm Bill of 2012 was passed, these countries were
aggravated with and resented its proposed legislation.197 Brazil, for
instance, expected reforms in the 2007 Bill after their favorable ruling
in the Upland Cotton case in the WTO in 2005.198 When the United
States failed to deliver, Brazil authorized a $4B sanction on the United
States as a form of retaliation.199
IV. THE SOLUTION TO DEVELOPED COUNTRIES’ NONCOMPLIANCE
WITH THE GATT
In view of the foregoing, one might ask why developing countries
such as the Philippines should stay in the WTO? While the WTO aims
to protect free trade around the world, its goal of equal product
treatment hurts underdeveloped countries while having a negligent
effect on powerhouses such as the United States and China. Proponents
of the WTO argue that these underdeveloped countries gain access to
world trade that would be more costly if they were to withdraw from the
WTO. However, market liberalization in developing countries does not
always follow from the WTO’s efforts. For instance, the 1990’s WTO
agreement on agriculture hindered the ability of developing countries to
liberalize their markets.200 Developed countries evaded the obligations
of the agreement through tariffs and by strategic use of its provisions.201
Developing countries rely on tariff revenues to finance food
production programs, such as research and extension services, irrigation
projects, and investment subsidies.202 Exempting developing countries
from tariff reduction for sensitive agricultural commodities would
enable a developing country to promote domestic food production,
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
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thereby reducing international market dependence.203 While this solution
seems practical, it is also implausible considering the WTO’s strict
enforcement of the GATT’s language in the likeness test. In addition,
these countries may already have reduced tariff rates based on the
GATT.204 It is therefore necessary to look to other solutions, such as
those that may require modifying the GATT, in order to equalize the
playing fields between developing and developed countries.
The United States plays a two-faced game. On the one hand, it
ratified a treaty that should result in fair free market trading. On the
other hand, it delays compliance with unfavorable WTO decisions.
Judging by the reforms in the 2007 Farm Bill and in ACRE, it seems
that the United States is finally on the path towards compliance, albeit
with a camel instead of a mustang. In the meantime, foreign developing
markets such as the Philippines are nearing bankruptcy.205
The solution lies in playing hardball with the rules of the WTO.
Those countries that are hurt by developed countries’ noncompliance
with WTO decisions should have other options besides imposing
sanctions and trade barriers. They need a tool in their arsenal that is not
facially illegal under the GATT, but is dangerous in the hands of
developing nations. One possible solution lies in the Dormant
Commerce Clause of the United States.
As discussed above, the DCC classifies different laws into three
categories: (a) facially discriminatory, (b) facially neutral with a
discriminatory effect, and (c) facially neutral without a discriminatory
effect. Those laws passed by developing countries that are facially
neutral but have a discriminatory effect should be allowed under the
GATT under these criteria: (1) the country is developing; (2) the
developing country has an enforceable judgment by the WTO against a
developed country’s law(s); (3) the developed country has not complied
with the judgment within a specific time frame; (4) the developing
country must show that the developed country’s noncompliance is
negatively impacting its economy.
The impact of such a law would make any developed country think
twice about non-compliance. It would give any developing country the
203. Id. at 486.
204. See Treatment of Developing Countries: Differential and More Favourable Treatment
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT
B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203 (1980).
205. Chris Wright, Philippines Renews Efforts to Balance Budget, EMERGING MARKETS
(Mar. 5, 2010), http://emergingmarkets.org/Article/2478534/Philippines-renews-efforts-tobalance-budget.html.
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ability to tax international products in a facially neutral yet
discriminatory manner. If we take United States noncompliance with
the Upland Cotton decision as an example, the effect of such a policy
would allow all non-developed countries to impose taxes on foreign
producers like the United States, such as a tax on alcoholic beverages
central to the Philippines case. In essence, giving this edge to
developing countries should balance out the fear of noncompliance in
the international community.
The beauty of such a principle lies in the fact that it would not
violate GATT principles of discrimination between countries. A law
that said, for example, “The United States shall pay X tax on all
imported corn,” would still be actionable in the WTO because it is
facially discriminatory. However, developing countries can look to their
own strengths and exploit the opportunity created by these new rules.
For instance, if developing country X is a major producer or
manufacturer of sugar cane, then it can impose taxes in a way that the
Philippines have done with their alcoholic spirits. The Philippines did
not tax other countries unfavorably, but rather imposed a tax on the raw
materials that made up the product.
It is imperative that we define the proposed criteria. The first
criterion—the country must be developing—is problematic. What
constitutes “developing”? One solution is that the WTO could
categorize countries based on their gross domestic product. The
WTO would define countries that fell below a particular percentage
or rank as “developing”. However, it is more effective to define a
nation as developing by using a multi-category economic index, such
as Heritage’s Index of Economic Freedom. The Index ranks
countries based on the assessment of ten economic factors, such as
government spending, freedom from corruption, fiscal freedom,
monetary freedom, and property rights.206 After ranking them, the
index groups the scores into categories of “economic freedom.”207 A
country that falls under the category of “Mostly Unfree” would be
considered a developing country.208
The problem with this system lies in the cut-off. Countries on the
wrong side of the cut-off may start underreporting revenues and engage
in otherwise deceitful activities to lower their standards so that they can
206. Index
of
Economic
http://www.heritage.org/index/ranking.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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take advantage of passing facially neutral discriminatory laws. The
solution is to have a non-partisan third party conduct the studies. In
addition, the countries on the cusp of “developing” would be dissuaded
from misreporting numbers because their economy may plummet.
Trading partners would be less inclined to continue the same business
ties with a country that is losing economic stability.
The second criterion—the developing country has an enforceable
judgment by the WTO against a developed countries’ law(s) – is
straightforward. The WTO decision should be enforceable, final, and
not be subject to appeal.
The third criterion—the developed country has not complied with
the judgment within a specific time frame—is harder to conceptualize.
Every product has a different shelf life. Grape producers in one
developed country may be more sensitive to time than producers in a
different country. Therefore, it is imperative that the WTO consider
each case individually and set a date for each case in which this
proposed law would take effect, should the developed country choose
not to comply with the WTO’s decision.
The final criterion—the developing country must show that
noncompliance by the developed country is negatively impacting its
economy—should be closely monitored. The developing country must
use economic data and research that demonstrates the law is adversely
impacting their economy. Again, exaggerated assessments, bribes, and
corruption may ensue. Therefore, non-partisan third parties should
conduct the studies. The developing country should apply to the WTO
for third party economic assessment research. Once the country meets
these criteria, the WTO can grant the country the ability to tax in
facially neutral ways.
Through this process, the hope—and, indeed, the plausible
reality—is that developed countries should start to comply with these
decisions. Otherwise, the economic consequences would be substantial.
Its deterrent effect should be sufficient to prevent countries from ever
having to utilize this new tool.
V. CONCLUSION
Countries choose to become members of the WTO in hopes of
developing their economy. The history of the WTO proves that while
many countries in the WTO sue others to alleviate some wrong practice
or procedure affecting their economy, these same countries may
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nevertheless neglect to comply with other WTO rulings.209 For the most
part, when countries neglect to comply with WTO decisions, it is
because of internal or external political battles and environmental
considerations. Typically, strong developed countries have more
bargaining clout and leeway when it comes to WTO compliance than
developing countries, such as the Philippines.
The Philippines case and the U.S. Farm Bill illustrate the point
above. The United States has not complied with the WTO ruling to fix
its agricultural subsidies. The subsidies given to American farmers
allow them to lower their prices on agricultural items in the world
market, forcing foreign producers, such as those in the Philippines, out
of the market. Not only are these developing countries suffering from
underdeveloped economies, but now they must struggle to maintain
their place in the world market by battling subsidies.
Concurrent with its violations of WTO rulings, the United States
sues developing countries in the WTO to equalize the taxes on alcoholic
beverages. While the United States is correct in that the Philippines is
taxing the spirits in violation of the principles in GATT, it is unfair to
force one country to comply with WTO rulings while the other plays a
foot-dragging game with the world.
To alleviate this problem, the WTO must arm developing countries
with a new weapon. Unlike existing weapons, such as sanctions, a new
weapon should be specifically tailored to non-compliant, developed
countries. Sanctions may or may not force a developed country to
budge. WTO case filings show that domestic corporations and groups
sway the developed countries into filing cases in the WTO.210 The new
weapon will have the most impact on the corporations who are not
complying with WTO rulings as opposed to general sanctions affecting
an entire industry. In turn, the corporations will pressure the United
States to change its policy so that the restrictions will be taken away.
The WTO should set out clear parameters for handing out such a
power. The WTO should build off these proposed criteria and establish
a third, unbiased party to determine whether the countries are not
committing fraud or circumventing the laws.
209. See, e.g., Patrick Nicholson, UK Hypocrisy at the WTO Will Hurt Poor Countries, INST.
AGRIC. & TRADE POL’Y (June 20, 2003), http://iatp.org/news/uk-hypocrisy-at-the-wto-will-hurtpoor-countries; Nate Anderson, IP Hypocrisy: US Likes WTO Rulings Only When It Wins,
ARSTECHNICA (Mar. 25, 2008, 6:46 PM), http://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2008/03/iphypocrisy-us-likes-wto-rulings-only-when-it-wins/.
210. Christina L. Davis and Sarah Blodgett Bermeo, Who Files? Developing Country
Participation in GATT/WTO Adjudication, 71 J. POL. 1033 (2009), available at
http://www.princeton.edu/cldavis/files/who_files.pdf.
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The solution is that a country which falls under these conditions
may impose a law that is facially neutral but has a discriminatory effect
when: (1) the country is developing, (2) the developing country has an
enforceable judgment by the WTO against a developed country’s
law(s), (3) the developed country has not complied with the judgment
within a specific time frame, and (4) the developing country must show
that the developed country’s noncompliance is negatively impacting its
economy. The goal of such a “weapon” in the hands of a developing
country is to deter non-compliance with WTO rulings, thereby
equalizing the playing field that is the world market.

